Terrorism in Iraq isn't over yet
By Steven Den Beste Posted in User Blogs — Comments (8) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »
From the diaries . . .
The Iraqi election is a great triumph. But that doesn't mean that terrorism in Iraq is going to vanish any time soon. I think it's going to escalate next year.
There's no doubt that the Iraqi election is a great triumph and a major
milestone. But it's possible to read more into it than should be. Smash
writes that this is the end for al Qaeda.
He's probably right, but that doesn't mean that this is the end of terrorism
in Iraq. The native Sunni terrorist campaign will increase in intensity during
the next six months or so, possibly as long as a year.
The Sunnis clearly have acknowledged that their decision to boycott the
January election was a massive blunder. As a result, the first parliament had a
relatively small number of Sunni members, mostly appointed. In the runup to the
ratification of the constitution in October, some Sunnis opposed ratification,
but others finally gained what was probably the best they could get, an
agreement from others in the parliament that when the new one was seated in
January that it would consider significant amendments.
What they're hoping to do is to reopen questions which probably were
permanently settled in October, most notably regarding federalism. By refusing
to participate in the January election, they did not have the influence they
really needed during the period in which the details of the constitution were
settled, and what they're going to try to do is to replay the game, starting in
January.
But they'll still be a minority, both in the parliament (where amendments
will have to be approved) and in the country as a whole (where they'd have to be
approved by voters). Some of the provisions in the constitution that they want
to change are broadly popular. Federalism, in particular, is especially popular
with the Kurds.
So what you're going to see is something like the bifurcation of the IRA into
an "activist wing" and a "political wing", where those in
the political wing disavow any knowledge of the activists and deny any ability
to influence them, even though everyone knew they were one and the same.
Sunni members of parliament will begin to make demands for constitutional
changes, and as they encounter resistance, there will be a rise of terrorist
attacks by the Sunni insurgency. The MPs will regretfully announce that there's
nothing they can do about it, but you know, if you just give us ground on these
amendments, maybe the attacks will slow or stop.
War is violence intended to accomplish a political goal. The Sunnis have now
given up on the idea of preventing a democratic government being formed; it's
pretty much now fait accompli. The best they can hope for now is to try
to influence the structure and policy of that government to their own benefit.
If they did that solely through political means, it would actually be healthy
and proper. That's what politics in a democratic system is supposed to be
about. But it isn't likely they've totally given up on using violence to get
what they want. The new threat won't be a sustained terrorist campaign intending
to derail the political process, it will be a campaign intended to influence
that process to the benefit of the terrorists and their sympathizers.
Will it work? Probably not. The problem now for terrorists in Iraq is that
they've largely lost the ability to terrorize. Iraqis don't like constant
attacks, but they're not willing to give in to stop them.
The response will be similar to what's been going on for the last nine months
or so: targeted military operations intended to clean out nests of insurgents,
combined with strong and active occupation afterwards to prevent those areas
from becoming reinfested. That was easier to do when the insurgents were mostly
foreigners, but it's still possible even if the insurgents are native Iraqis.
The real thing to fear is terrorist backlash. If the attacks continue long
enough, and cause enough damage, eventually Kurds and/or Shiites will start
making counter-attacks against Sunni targets. Some of that is already going on;
the concern is that it will escalate into a full-blown two-tits-for-tat exchange
of retalations. The only way to prevent that is for the Kurds and Shiites to
believe that US and Iraqi military forces are making progress in finding and
taking out those responsible for making those attacks.
The next nine months may well be the most critical in the entire war for
deciding whether this experiment in forcing democracy on Arabs will succeed or
fail.
UPDATE: I think the real make-or-break issue will be a broad amnesty for Sunnis who worked for Saddam. If Parliament is willing to make significant concessions on this -- and I think they will, as long as a few top people are not given amnesty -- then the entire problem could be averted. That's much more important than federalism and it would not require any changes to the constitution.
I largely agree with your model of the Sunni incentives, and the IRA analogy, but I think enough of the variables are different to warrant a different conclusion.
When the insurgency began a couple years ago several things were unknown.
- Would the USA be steadfast?
- Would the USA+Iraqi Coalition be competent at finding insurgent operating cells?
- Would the Sunni public support an insurgency, and give them aid & comfort?
- Would the Iraqi government be inclusive, or would the Shia use their numbers to tyrannize the Sunni?
Given the number of unknowns, the optimistic insurgent could believe he had a shot at re-establishing Sunni control of Iraq. The US would be driven out, the Shia and Kurds brow-beaten, and the millions of Sunni Iraqis would be a endless supply of support and troops.
All of those questions have been answered in the last two years however, and from a Sunni insurgent's p.o.v., unfavorably.
More than that, there are a few differences between Iraq and N. Ireland.
- The Iraqi army is less civilized than the British army. In an ideological war where death is irrelevant this wouldn't matter, but in a political game where survival & comfort are motivating factors, it matters a lot.
- Northern Ireland was ethnicly homogenous (if not religiously so), and a body of water seperated it from the rest of England, providing a buffer effect. If London were 1/2 Irish in population and the English had to put up with insurgency personally and on a daily basis, I think the IRA would not have lasted anywhere near as long. Public support for harsh measures would have risen more quickly and to greater heights.
- English vigialanteism was unlikely; the Sunni politico must know that same is not true for the Shia and Kurds.
- The Sunni population has given them up. Lot of reports lately of Baathist hold-outs and Al Qaeda types being turned over by Sunni locals in the Triangle. Tips are way up month over month, and the trend suggests it will only go further.
I think that Sunni terrorism in Iraq has peaked. I know they'll still debate whether or not to use it, but I think the decision will be to not use it. The slightest whif of a connection between 20 dead schoolkids in Baghdad and the Sunni Parliamentarians will kill their bargaining power in the Amendment process.
An amnesty would only be from the govt; personal revenge would be unaffected, and I'm hard-pressed to imagine the new govt, with a Shia/Kurd majority, aggressively prosecuting "legitimate" revenge killings.
Jut a hunch, but such killings would likely be treated gently by the law, so long as they were directed at the individual responsible for the original atrocity, and not - as Steven called it - in a "two-tits-for-tat" manner involving other family members. The tacit philosophy will be one of: revenge, yes; escalation, no.
To which country will the worst of Saddam's former henchmen ultimately flee?
As the MSM is bount to do, most people don't even pay attention to the lessons of history. They're too caught up in the Hollywood model of conflicts being resolved in time for one to hit the bathroom or wolf down the TV dinner.
I woudn't expect the terrorists to just give up and go away anyways. If they did, they'd just join the rest of the former Baathists and take the hike over the Syrian border, from where they may continue to attempt to tear down the new democratic Iraq that we Americans have helped build up in place of Saddam. As long as that's in place (and American soldiers are present), the remnants of Al Qaeda and its allies will continue to take their potshots at us. And, unfortunately, some of those shots are going to hit someone (and in the case of those IEDs, a dozen or more somebodies, many of whom wouldn't even be part of any military or government).
Terrorists are terrorists. They're gonna try and take out bystanders and children, because that's what they do. It'll be up to the Iraqi people themselves do do what needs to be done to make it almost impossible for them to keep doing so, but at least I have confidence that they're not going to do any hand-wringing while doing so and end up losing by not allowing their soldiers to get the job done.
I guess I'm seeing the effects of our strategy trying to get the sunnis (residents, after all) into the political game, as opposed to Al Qaeda and related outsiders. Those outside terrorists won't stop, but they will likely go elsewhere if driven so. I think we're on the verge of seeing just that driving.
It seems the Sunnis are all set to accomodate themselves, which is why the internal Iraqi calls for our departure are interesting. Moq Sadr has always led this charge (let's assume he's an Iranian stooge, although very local) and some Sunnis are as well.
Many others, especially the Kurds, are not.
I think we'll begin leaving soon, and accelerate it as we see political compromises made among those who see a federal Iraq, as opposed to those who don't. If a Sunni/Kurd compromise can stick (two minorities who may almost add up to the Shiite majority), and some Shiite areas remain calm - we may just have enough impetus to leave and let them decide whether they want it to work, or whether they want to have at it in a civil war. We'll make clear then that we'll stuck to the Kurds, and let sunnis do unto others what they've done to us.
A key indicator may be if the new government decides to allow for US bases, but only in Kurdish areas - that would be a wrinkle which might fly, and still cause enough problems for those wanting to stick with guns instead of votes.
Jordan, because the US is dealing with them as part of a longer relationship. Also, the ruling family of Jordan has a legitimate claim on the throne of Iraq, although they have a greater interest in reclaiming Mecca and Medina from the House of Saud.
Now that the House of Hussein is all but destroyed, their courtiers may be willing to change courts. Like many a displaced nobility, they will probably play whereever they can as long as the money holds out, and then lend themselves to any vile activity that will allow them to continue to avoid anything that resembles work.
Because the henchmen have been so deeply vile and are liable for charges of crimes against humanity, their fortunes are constrained in a variety of ways. It would not surprise me to see Jordan become disgusted with the henchmen very soon and withdraw their immunity in a series of vigorous arrests.
I suspect that the disintegration of the Russian nobility will seem like a golden age by comparison.
We would have two broad groups fleed Iraq.
Ex-baathists (and other supporters of the Saddam regime) and Al-queda.
Baathists would want to go to Baathist Syria to live in exile or try to carry on the fight from a safer location.
Al-Queda is a different question.
I do NOT think Jordan a likley refuge. Al-Queda isn't popular there right now. Despite the whole Sunni-Shiite "heresy" problem, any port in a storm means heading to Iran, who is already sheltering members of al-Queda who jumped ship from Afghanistan.
Another good place to go to ground is Saudi Arabia, where hardline Wahabbist thinking is alive and well and there are plenty of officials who will look the other way for a small price. The Saudis don't go after anyone who doesn't make trouble within its borders so all a terroist need do is curb his enthusiasm when it comes to local politics.
Have you heard anything lately about a fund for the public to share in oil revenues? I recall much discussion of this just following the invasion, along the lines of the Alaska fund or some such, but haven't heard a hint lately. Was this one of the issues which the existing government was willing to let stand, and have revenues flow into government coffers?
Aside from sunni political irredentism I wonder what the proposed financing arrangements are. I suspect there may be a race afoot between violence and cash - and oil revenues seem to provide enough cash for all. A leading bad news indicator may be increased targeting of oil facilities as opposed to bodily violence, and that might give the "activist" and "political" wings less odious moral grounds to stand on.
About the only benefit of that would be to ease our exit, and avoid leaving under fire.